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Martin Feldstein
Financial and currency crises have occurred for as long as there have been
financial markets. However, the crises in the emerging market econo-
mies since the late 1990s were more global and potentially more damag-
ing to economic and political stability than the crises of the past. The
events that began in Thailand in 1997 eventually enveloped several coun-
tries ofeast Asia, as well as Russia, Turkey, and key Latin American econ-
omies. Finding ways to reduce the risk of future crises and to improve the
management of crises when they do occur is a policy challenge of great
importance.
The crises that hit Latin America in the 1980s were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from those of the 1990s. The governments of Latin America had borrowed
heavily from foreign commercial banks during the 1970s, encouraged by
very low real interest rates and by high prices for their commodity exports.
When real interest rates rose sharply at the end of that decade and an Amer-
This volume contains a combination of background papers by economists on various as-
pects of the ﬁnancial crises and personal statements of seventeen individuals who have dealt
with the recent ﬁnancial crises as oﬃcials of U.S. and foreign governments and of international
organizations, private sector executives, and academic analysts. This introductory chapter ben-
eﬁtted from what the author learned at the conference as well as from the papers and discus-
sions at two other NBER conferences, which appear in collected form as Preventing Currency
Crises in Emerging Markets,edited by Sebastian Edwards and JeﬀreyA. Frankel (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2002) and Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets,edited by
Michael P. Dooley and JeﬀreyA. Frankel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). The au-
thor also beneﬁtted from the NBER meetings on individual crisis countries; the discussions at
those meetings are summarized by John McHale on the NBER web site at The NBER Project
on Exchange Rate Crises. Some of the author’s earlier views on these issues were presented in
“Refocusing the IMF,” Foreign Aﬀairs, March/April 1998, “A Self-Help Guide for Emerging
Markets,” Foreign Aﬀairs, March/April 1999, and “No New Architecture,” The International
Economy, September/October 1999.ican recession reduced the demand for Latin American exports, the bor-
rower countries were unable to service their debts. As a result, the major
money center banks of the United States and Europe were signiﬁcantly im-
paired, causing widespread concern about the possibility of a systemic bank-
ing crisis in the industrial world. The Latin American governments were
forced to reduce the spending that had been ﬁnanced by foreign credits and
to deﬂate their economies even further in order to increase net exports so that
they could make interest and principal payments on their external debt. The
combination of these actions, a general recovery of global demand, a decline
of real interest rates, and some forced write-downs of debt eventually
brought the crisis to an end. Even after it was resolved, however, incomes in
Latin America remained below their precrisis levels for some time.
Governments and banks learned some important lessons from this expe-
rience. The Latin American governments ﬁnanced their subsequent budget
deﬁcits in their domestic capital markets to a much greater extent,1 and the
commercial banks of the industrial counties reduced their lending to for-
eign governments. Although large current account deﬁcits continued in sev-
eral countries, they were ﬁnanced primarily by a combination of private
borrowing in international bond markets, equity ﬂows, and foreign direct
investment.
The late 1980s and 1990s saw a very substantial expansion of the global
capital market with rapid increases in private debt and equity ﬂows and in
foreign direct investment.2 This expansion reﬂected a wide variety of
changes in the global political environment, in ﬁnancial technology, and in
investors’ preferences. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the general
shift to more democratic and market-oriented policies around the world in-
creased the attractiveness of lending and investing in the emerging market
countries and the desire of their governments to attract foreign equity cap-
ital. Technological developments facilitated global portfolio management
and the retail index funds that shifted debt and equity investments to emerg-
ing economies. Portfolio investors seized the opportunity to diversify port-
folios in pursuit of the higher returns and the lower overall volatility that
they believed would follow such diversiﬁcation.
Avoiding the mistakes of the 1970s did not, however, prevent a return of
international ﬁnancial crises. In retrospect, the crises of the 1990s were due
primarily to a combination of unsustainable current account deﬁcits, ex-
cessive short-term foreign debts, and weak domestic banking systems. Al-
though the experience in each crisis country was unique, one or more of
these adverse conditions was present in each case.
The industrial countries responded to these crises both directly and
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1. Argentina was an exception to this, borrowing heavily in dollars in the international mar-
kets to ﬁnance its government deﬁcits.
2. See the papers and personal commentaries in Feldstein 1999 for analyses of these capital
ﬂows.through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with substantial pack-
ages of ﬁnancial support and with the imposition of wide-ranging require-
ments of domestic economic reforms. Now, however, more than four years
after the crises began, the major crisis countries have neither returned to
their precrisis rates of economic growth nor achieved the structural reforms
that the IMF had tried to impose.
What, then, are the lessons to be learned from this experience? What can
be done to reduce the risk of recurrent crises in emerging market countries?
And how can the crises that will occur in the future be managed in a way
that reduces the direct adverse consequences of dealing with those crises
and that also discourages behavior by emerging market countries and by
foreign creditors that increases the risk of future crises?
Although much has been learned about the answers to these questions,
there is no general agreement about all of these issues among economists or
among others who have dealt with these problems. Although the research
and discussion in the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
project has strongly inﬂuenced my thinking, what follows is my personal
view rather than an attempt to summarize the background and research pa-
pers that appear in this and related NBER volumes or in the personal state-
ments and discussion summaries in this volume. They speak eloquently for
themselves.
Reducing the Risk of Financial and Currency Crises in Emerging Markets
Fixed Exchange Rates, Current Account Deﬁcits, and Debt Deﬂation
A primary cause of the crises that began with Mexico in the mid-1990s
and continued in East Asia in the late 1990s was a large and growing cur-
rent account deﬁcit caused by a ﬁxed exchange rate. The experience in Thai-
land illustrates this very dramatically. Thailand ﬁxed the value of the baht
at twenty-ﬁve baht to the dollar, a level that initially made Thai exports very
competitive. As the dollar fell relative to the Japanese yen, the baht fell with
it, increasing the competitiveness of Thai products in Japanese and other
markets. The stable dollar-baht exchange rate encouraged Thai companies
to ﬁnance themselves by borrowing dollars (which had lower interest rates
than baht) even when their only sales revenue were in baht, because they
were told by the Thai government that the baht-dollar rate would remain
unchanged, a statement quite consistent with their observation over several
years. Thai banks also borrowed dollars on the world market and lent them
to these local companies, comfortable in the knowledge that their dollar as-
sets and liabilities were balanced even though the Thai borrowers did not
earn dollars directly but depended on converting their baht incomes into
dollars to service their dollar debts.
Eventually, however, the baht became overvalued, reﬂecting rising do-
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the Japanese yen. Thailand’s current account deﬁcit grew rapidly, reaching
4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the early 1990s and surging
to 8 percent of GDP by 1997. This unsustainable current account deﬁcit
caused substantial selling of baht by foreign investors. The Thai govern-
ment responded by defending the baht with their foreign exchange reserves
and then used the forward market to support the baht so that they could ap-
pear to maintain their foreign exchange reserves even as their true net posi-
tion deteriorated. Eventually, the negative forward market position equaled
the country’s net reserves. At that point, the Thai government had no choice
but to stop pegging the value of the currency. The baht ﬂoated to nearly ﬁfty
baht to the dollar, half of its precrisis value.
This fall in the value of the baht caused the baht value of dollar-
denominated debt to double. For the many companies that were both highly
leveraged in dollars and dependent on baht earnings to pay their dollar lia-
bilities, the doubling of the debt meant bankruptcy. The banks that had
made loans to those companies were also bankrupt and unable to pay the
foreign creditors who had loaned them dollars during the ﬁxed exchange
rate period. The widespread bankruptcies caused a sharp economic down-
turn.
Thailand was not unusual in experiencing the ravages of debt deﬂation
when its currency devalued. The experience during all of the crises shows
that the existence of large amounts of private debt denominated in dollars
or other hard currencies is the most serious source of economic hardship
facing the economy. When the domestic currency comes down in value, a
bank or nonﬁnancial company that has a large dollar debt sees its indebt-
edness rise sharply in the local currency. Avoiding large amounts of dollar-
denominated debt, and particularly private dollar debt, is probably the
most useful thing that a country and corporation can do to reduce the seri-
ous consequences of a currency fall. This is true of ﬁnancial institutions as
well as of nonﬁnancial companies.
Countries adopt ﬁxed (but potentially adjustable) exchange rates3 for a
variety of reasons. A ﬁxed exchange rate can provide a nominal anchor that
helps the country to achieve price stability. A ﬁxed exchange rate also en-
courages an inﬂow of foreign capital and, by appearing to eliminate ex-
change rate volatility, can keep interest rates lower than they would other-
wise be. However, a ﬁxed exchange rate also brings with it the danger that
the real exchange rate becomes overvalued, either because the domestic
price level increases more rapidly than that of competing countries or be-
cause of a relative decline in the nominal value of the competing currencies
4 Martin Feldstein
3. All so-called ﬁxed exchange rates are potentially adjustable unless the country literally
gives up its currency (as the members of the European Economic and Monetary Union have
done). Even a currency board country like Argentina has a potentially adjustable exchange
rate, a fact supported by the currency risk in the interest rate in excess of the country risk.to which the home currency is not pegged. Foreign lenders may be induced
by higher interest rates to continue ﬁnancing a growing current account
deﬁcit, but eventually the fear of devaluation overcomes the high interest
rate reward. At that point, lenders will no longer extend loans when they
are due or roll over bond debt that matures. This problem is exacerbated
by domestic residents who convert funds and take them out of the country.
When  these things happen, the currency declines, possibly by a large
amount.
Governments that have ﬁxed their exchange rate at an unsustainable level
are reluctant to devalue as soon as they should because devaluation is itself
painful. Doing so raises domestic inﬂation and, when domestic debts are
written in the foreign currency, causes widespread losses and possible bank-
ruptcies. Those who would lose are often politically well connected. In ad-
dition, delaying provides the opportunity for a spontaneous correction of
the current account deﬁcit if the real exchange rate of the competing cur-
rency appreciates. Unfortunately, waiting longer to devalue often merely
exacerbates the trade imbalance and makes the cost of devaluation greater
when it does occur.
The obvious alternative to a ﬁxed but adjustable exchange rate is a ﬂoat-
ing currency. If the currency ﬂoats, a growing current account deﬁcit will
generally be self-correcting because the value of the currency declines as ﬁ-
nancial market participants sell the currency in response to the increased
current account deﬁcit in order to protect themselves from a potential fu-
ture currency decline. Although a ﬂoating currency introduces volatility
that makes business more diﬃcult for exporters and for those companies
that compete with imports from abroad, the pain caused to them is much
less than the pain of the crises and bankruptcies that occur when an over-
valued ﬁxed currency falls in a sharp devaluation. Experience in Brazil, Is-
rael, and elsewhere shows that the potential inﬂationary eﬀect of a ﬂoating
exchange rate can be dealt with by tightening monetary policy to achieve
the country’s desired rate of inﬂation.
Although there is a growing consensus among economists in favor of
ﬂoating exchange rates, many countries have “managed ﬂoats”: exchange
rate systems in which they intervene extensively to stabilize the value of the
currency. In principle, such a system might be an improvement on a clean
ﬂoat if oﬃcials increase the short-term stability of the exchange rate while
allowing the exchange rate to adjust in ways that oﬀset current account im-
balances and diﬀerences in inﬂation rates. In practice, however, it appears
to be too diﬃcult for oﬃcials to avoid the temptation to prevent a currency
decline even when fundamentals point in that direction. The result is the
same problems as those created in a more explicitly ﬁxed-but-adjustable
exchange rate regime.
Despite the obvious problems with ﬁxed exchange rates, there is still some
professional support for ﬁxed exchange rates that are supported by cur-
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are permanently ﬁxed by a mechanism that automatically raises interest
rates by enough to maintain demand for the currency at its pegged exchange
rate. Although Argentina, the leading currency board country, has (as of
the time of this writing in October 2001) been able to maintain its ﬁxed ex-
change rate vis-à-vis the dollar, its situation is precarious. Brazil, Ar-
gentina’s largest competitor, has a ﬂoating exchange rate that has made the
Brazilian real increasingly competitive and the Argentine peso increasingly
uncompetitive. The result has been to create a growing trade deﬁcit in Ar-
gentina, putting signiﬁcant pressure on the currency that translates into
extremely high real interest rates in Argentina. Those high interest rates
produce substantial economic weakness and cause a ballooning of the
government deﬁcit because of the higher interest on the national debt and
the lower taxes caused by the economic downturn.
Domingo Cavallo, the ﬁnance minister who established the currency
board system in Argentina in order to end the hyperinﬂation that previously
plagued his country, makes it clear in his comment in this volume that he
does not see the currency board as a permanent arrangement. Instead, he
spoke of looking ahead to a time when the Argentine currency would gen-
erally be perceived as undervalued so that its link to the dollar could be
ended and the currency could ﬂoat to a higher value. Since the conference
at which he made these remarks, the sharp decline of the Brazilian real has
caused a major increase in Argentina’s current account deﬁcit, thereby put-
ting substantial downward pressure on its currency.
Argentina’s ﬁxed exchange rate system is made even more unstable by a
full capital account convertibility that not only allows Argentinians to con-
vert pesos to dollars at a ﬁxed exchange rate of one peso per dollar but that
also allows an unlimited export of those dollars. If the time comes when
enough Argentinians fear an end of the ﬁxed exchange rate and a peso de-
valuation, the capital outﬂow will force that collapse to occur.
In my judgment, the evidence from around the world during the past
decade, as well as much evidence from earlier years, points clearly to the
conclusion that any form of ﬁxed but potentially adjustable exchange rate,
including currency board arrangements, raises the risk of unsustainable
current account deﬁcits and a subsequent currency crisis.4
This has induced Ecuador to abandon its own currency in favor of using
the U.S. dollar and has caused a number of economists to call for dollar-
ization more generally in Latin America and elsewhere. Dollarization
diﬀers from a dollar-based currency board in completely abolishing the lo-
cal currency. There are three serious problems with such an approach. First,
6 Martin Feldstein
4. Despite the adverse experience with ﬁxed-but-adjustable exchange rates, the IMF contin-
ues its policy of not advising governments on the choice of exchange rate system. It explicitly
supported the Argentinian currency board arrangement by a large loan in 2001.because the country has a diﬀerent pattern of imports and exports from that
of the United States, the exchange rate between the dollar and other cur-
rencies around the world that is suitable for the United States may lead to
substantial trade deﬁcits for the dollarizing country unless it is able to
achieve a real devaluation by reducing its domestic price level, a diﬃcult
task at best. Second, cyclical ﬂuctuations in demand cannot be modulated
by automatic or induced interest rate changes since, except for default risk,
the interest rate on dollar loans must be the same in the dollarized emerg-
ing market country as they are in the United States.
Third, because the central bank of the dollarized country does not have
the ability to create dollars it cannot act as a lender of last resort if there is
a run on any of the local commercial banks. Although residents use ordi-
nary dollar bills for cash transactions, they also have checking and time de-
posit accounts that represent claims on dollars from their commercial
banks. If residents become nervous about whether these “dollar” deposits
can actually be shifted into dollars that can be held as currency or sent out
of the country, they may create bank runs that the government cannot man-
age because it lacks suﬃcient dollars and the ability to create dollars. Dol-
larization does not seem any more likely to be a viable long-term strategy
than a currency board.
Capital Account Convertibility
The issue of capital account convertibility is important in its own right.
Many countries that have current account convertibility (i.e., that allow
foreigners and local residents to buy and sell the currency for trade pur-
poses) do not have capital account convertibility (i.e., do not allow the pur-
chase and sale of the currency for portfolio investments). Capital account
convertibility can beneﬁt a country by encouraging capital inﬂows and by
permitting domestic residents to enjoy the beneﬁts of international portfo-
lio diversiﬁcation. However, capital account convertibility brings with it the
possibility of much more volatile capital ﬂows that can destabilize domestic
ﬁnancial markets and the exchange rate.
A compromise arrangement that can provide most of the advantages of
foreign capital inﬂows while reducing the volatility that can result from
speculative inﬂows and outﬂows has been developed in Chile. The Chilean
government has from time to time taxed short-term capital inﬂows (by re-
quiring that ﬁnancial inﬂows be held in the country for a period of time
without receiving interest), thus discouraging speculative inﬂows while still
having the advantage of foreign direct investment and longer-term debt and
equity capital.
Financial Supervision
The gains from an open capital account are more likely to outweigh the
potential adverse eﬀects in a country where the domestic ﬁnancial system is
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Thai banks’ policy of borrowing dollars from abroad and then lending
those dollars to Thai companies. Although this appeared to be a reasonable
activity as long as the exchange rate between the Thai baht and the dollar
was unchanged, it was in fact a very risky strategy because the Thai busi-
nesses generally did not have the ability to earn dollars. When the currency
fell sharply relative to the dollar, the Thai banks were unable to collect on
their loans. If the banking supervisors had been doing their job correctly,
they would never have allowed the banks to accept large dollar liabilities
oﬀset by dollar loans that lacked real value because they depended on the
ﬁxity of the exchange rate.
The weakness of banking supervision and regulation was also a problem
in Korea. When the Korean capital market was opened more broadly, some
of the Korean nonbank ﬁnancial institutions borrowed heavily abroad in
dollars and then lent these funds to Korean ﬁrms or used them to speculate
in high-risk assets like Russian bonds. Even the major Korean banks and
corporations borrowed dollars to ﬁnance activities in Korea. The crisis in
Korea occurred when foreign investors recognized that the sum of the
short-term dollar liabilities of the Korean public and private sectors ex-
ceeded the country’s foreign exchange reserves. They worried correctly that
if any of the country’s creditors chose not to roll over the loans and the bond
debt that were coming due in the next year, the remaining creditors could
not all be paid. When they saw that, many gave notice that they would not
renew their credit, forcing Korea to use up its foreign exchange reserves and
eventually to turn to the IMF for help in dealing with its crisis. Here too a
crisis might have been avoided by better banking supervision and by regu-
lation that limited the exposure to foreign currency liabilities.
The soundness of the domestic ﬁnancial system is important for local de-
positors as well as for foreign creditors. If depositors come to believe that
the volume of bad loans and investments causes the liabilities of the do-
mestic banks to exceed the real value of their assets, depositors will with-
draw funds and precipitate a banking crisis. Although the risk of this can be
reduced by the government’s provision of complete deposit insurance, that
encourages more risky lending by banks. Moreover, when large depositors
fear that banking failures will lead to a currency depreciation, they will
want to shift their funds to foreign banks even if there is deposit insurance
in the domestic currency.
It is signiﬁcant that the banking systems in so many of the crisis countries
were weak and now remain insolvent or nationalized or both. Countries
with strong banking systems and good bank supervision, like Singapore,
avoided the diﬃculties that happened in the crisis countries. Brazil avoided
the banking problems that aﬀected so many of the others because a very
large fraction of its total bank assets was in Brazilian government bonds.
Argentina had an early crisis in which many banks failed but now has
8 Martin Feldsteinshifted the ownership of most of its banking industry to foreign banks, pri-
marily from the United States and Spain, that provide a much greater pro-
fessionalism of management. Mexico recently changed its banking law to
permit majority foreign ownership of its banks. Although many countries
resist such foreign ownership for a variety of reasons, it does appear to be
one way of improving banking practice quickly.
Foreign Exchange Liabilities and Reserves
An excess of short-term foreign currency liabilities over a nation’s foreign
exchange reserves readily precipitates a crisis. Countries ﬁnd themselves in
that situation not only because of the excessive currency risk taken by ﬁ-
nancial institutions and nonﬁnancial corporations but also because of the
traditional policy of many emerging market countries of having foreign ex-
change reserves that are too small in the context of the current global capi-
tal markets. A traditional approach has been to hold foreign exchange re-
serves equal to three months of imports. Although that standard might be
relevant for countries without capital account convertibility, it is clearly not
relevant when the country is exposed to large ﬂuctuations in capital ﬂows.
There is of course no level of reserves that can protect an exchange rate
that is fundamentally overvalued (as indicated by a large and growing cur-
rent account deﬁcit). The purpose of reserves in a ﬂoating rate regime is to
protect a country’s currency against unwarranted speculative attacks. For
that purpose the standard for judging the adequacy of reserves is the size of
the speculative attack that might be mounted against the country. China,
with reserves of more than $150 billion, and Taiwan, with more than $100
billion, do not have to worry about speculative attacks. Korea learned its
lesson in 1997 and now also has reserves of more than $100 billion.
A second measure of the adequacy of foreign exchange reserves is the size
of reserves relative to the foreign currency liabilities that will be due in a year
or less. It was a failure to have adequate reserves by this standard that
caused the crisis in Korea. To improve this balance, it is easier and less
costly for a country to limit its short-term liabilities than to increase its for-
eign exchange assets. The government itself can avoid short-term borrow-
ing and extend the duration of its debts as they come close to maturity. The
Chilean system of mandatory deposits achieves much the same thing for
private capital inﬂows.
However, the absolute level of foreign exchange reserves, and not just
those reserves in relation to short-term liabilities, is important for deterring
speculative attacks. Emerging market countries are nevertheless generally
reluctant to hold adequate reserves because of the perceived high cost of
doing so. Large reserves appear costly because these countries typically
hold their reserves in U.S. Treasury bills, which have a yield far below the
country’s own cost of borrowing dollars and far below the opportunity cost
of those reserves as measured by the potential yield on real investments
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damage that would follow a successful speculative attack on the currency.
It is possible, moreover, to reduce the net cost of large reserves by hold-
ing reserves in a form that provides immediate liquidity but with a higher
yield than Treasury bills. A country that holds a signiﬁcant portion of its re-
serves in the form of a broadly diversiﬁed portfolio of foreign equities can
expect a signiﬁcantly higher rate of return and therefore a lower net cost of
holding reserves. Although such an equity fund would involve greater in-
vestment risk than a portfolio invested in U.S. Treasury bills, the overall risk
that the country faces may be lower with a larger and riskier foreign ex-
change portfolio than with a smaller portfolio of safer assets, substituting
some investment risk for less risk of speculative attack.
In short, there are ﬁve primary ways in which a country can reduce the
risk of a currency crisis: (a) avoiding an overvalued currency by allowing the
currency’s value to ﬂoat; (b) maintaining a substantial level of foreign ex-
change reserves; (c) keeping short-term foreign exchange liabilities low rel-
ative to reserves; (d) maintaining a sound banking system; and (e) avoid-
ing large amounts of dollar-denominated debt, especially the debt of the
private sector.
Although these policies can in principle avoid the fundamental factors
that caused the crises of the 1980s and 1990s and discourage purely specu-
lative “contagion” attacks, crises will no doubt continue to happen in the
future. The fact that the crises of the 1990s were caused by diﬀerent condi-
tions than those that caused the crises of the 1980s should, in itself, be a
warning that conditions that we do not now anticipate may cause crises in
the future. All that countries can do to protect themselves is to avoid the
policies that caused crises in the past.
If a crisis does occur, the consequences for the economy will depend on
how the crisis is managed and on the structural condition within the econ-
omy at the time of the crisis. Before we discuss the management of crises, it
is useful to consider how the policies of the industrial countries might be
modiﬁed to reduce the risk of ﬁnancial and currency crises in the emerging
market economies.
Policies of the Industrial Countries
Although there are in principle a variety of things that the United States
and other industrial countries could do to reduce the risk of crises in the
emerging markets, there is in fact little likelihood that those things will be
done to an extent that will have an appreciable eﬀect on the risk of future
crises. It is nevertheless worth reviewing some of the key suggestions that
have been made for changes in industrial country policies.
Stabilizing Exchange Rates Among the Industrial Countries
Fluctuations of the exchange rates among the dollar, the yen, and the
euro can exacerbate trade deﬁcits of emerging market countries, precipitat-
10 Martin Feldsteining balance-of-payment crises. A country that has dollar-denominated lia-
bilities but that earns yen or euros from its exports could see its ability to
service its debts suﬀer if the dollar appreciates relative to the other curren-
cies. The rise of the dollar in the 1980s hurt Latin American economies, the
fall of the yen in the mid-1990s hurt the economies of Southeast Asia, and
the decline of the euro exacerbated Argentina’s trade deﬁcit. Similarly, a
country that imports dollar-denominated products (like oil) but exports to
Europe or Japan would have diﬃculty paying for its imports if the dollar ap-
preciates relative to the other Group of Three (G3) currencies. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the emerging market countries and several econo-
mists have spoken of the advantages of stabilizing the exchange rates among
the dollar, yen, and euro.
In reality, there is little prospect that the United States and other coun-
tries will pursue deliberate policies to stabilize their exchange rates. To some
extent, more stable exchange rates among the three major industrial cur-
rencies will occur as a result of policies aimed at low inﬂation and low bud-
get deﬁcits. However, going beyond that to stop ﬂuctuations would require
adopting a common monetary policy, something that none of the govern-
ments or central banks would contemplate.5
The emerging market countries should therefore act on the assumption
that the major exchange rates will vary. That implies a further reason to
ﬂoat and to avoid debt that is denominated in dollars or any other single
currency. A country that does borrow abroad might protect itself from cur-
rency ﬂuctuations by borrowing in a mix of currencies.
Avoiding High Interest Rates
Countries that borrow in dollars or other hard currencies are directly
aﬀected by any increase in the interest rates in the home countries of those
currencies. Market participants also believe that an increase in the dollar in-
terest rate causes interest rates on emerging market loans to rise by more
than an equal amount. Since there is no prospect that the industrial coun-
tries will modify their domestic monetary policy in order to reduce adverse
eﬀects on the emerging market countries, private and public borrowers in
those countries must take into account the possibility of interest rate moves
that are not based on local conditions, making the optimal debt level less
than it would otherwise be and increasing the optimal maturity of that debt.
Opening Markets to Emerging market Products
Opening the industrial-country markets to increase imports of textiles
and agricultural products from the emerging market countries would raise
the standard of living in the export countries as well as among the im-
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5. Alternatively, without a common monetary policy, attempts to reduce currency ﬂuctua-
tions would lead to ﬂuctuations in interest rates that could be as unsettling to the emerging
market economies as the exchange rate ﬂuctuations.porters. It is an idea widely supported by economists and opposed by the
special interests in the industrial countries that would be hurt by the import
competition. Progress toward greater market opening will therefore con-
tinue to be slow. Moreover, such market opening might do little to reduce
the risk of economic crises. The more open markets would provide a per-
manent improvement in the level of exports but might not change the net
balance of trade once imports had adjusted to the new ability to ﬁnance in-
creased imports.
Regulating Lending by Private Industrial-Country Creditors
After both the Latin American crisis of the 1980s and the Asian crisis of
the 1990s there was widespread agreement that there had been too much
borrowing by private and public entities in the crisis countries. When there
is too much borrowing, there is also too much lending. Many experts there-
fore suggest that steps be taken to reduce the amount of lending to emerg-
ing market countries and to increase creditors’ sensitivity to the risks in-
volved.
Bank supervisors in industrial countries do provide oversight on the
amount and concentration of emerging market-country lending by the
banks for which they are responsible. This is reinforced by the Basel capital
rules that require more capital per dollar of loans or investments in emerg-
ing market countries, although these rules were misleading when they
treated the sovereign debt of Mexico and Korea as free of credit risk because
both countries are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). Requiring banks to mark credit portfolios to
market would be another discipline on bank lending and risk taking.
The shift from bank lending to the emerging market countries in the
1980s to the international bond market in the 1990s reduced the role of
bank supervision and capital requirements in limiting credit to the emerg-
ing market countries. Bond ﬁnance generally places assets in less leveraged
institutions (pension funds, insurance companies, etc.) and reduces the risk
of systemic damage to the industrial-country ﬁnancial institutions. How-
ever, this dispersion of ownership may encourage a greater amount of lend-
ing and make it diﬃcult for the creditor countries to track the amount
loaned by entities within its borders, let alone the global amount of lending
to particular borrowing countries. When conditions look favorable in
emerging markets, it is easy for lenders to rush in, unaware of the total
amount of debt being incurred by the countries to which they are lending.
Even if the credit standing of the borrowers is good, the accumulation of
substantial debt may strain foreign exchange availability.
Providing a Lender of Last Resort
A nation’s central bank can prevent runs on solvent commercial banks by
providing suﬃcient liquidity to assure depositors and other creditors that
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collateral. The very existence of such a lender of last resort helps to reduce
the risk of domestic ﬁnancial crises.
There is no such institution in the international economy that can lend
foreign exchange to solvent central banks to assure foreign creditors that
they need not fear a collapsing currency. Some have suggested that the IMF
or the Bank for International Settlements might play such a role. (The IMF
programs since the Thailand crisis of 1997 have involved large amounts of
ﬁnancial assistance, but these payments are conditioned on various struc-
tural reforms and are not available immediately—the key requirement of a
lender of last resort.) Opponents of creating such a facility note that central
banks do not have the illiquid but good collateral that are the key to the do-
mestic lender-of-last-resort transactions. Opponents also worry that the
availability of such a lender in the international context would create moral
hazard problems, encouraging more commercial lending to the emerging
market countries in the expectation that the loans would be repaid with the
funds provided by the lender of last resort.
In practice, the potential for an international analog of the domestic cen-
tral bank as lender of last resort will fail for the simple reason that the IMF
does not have the resources to “lend freely” (as Bagehot advised in his clas-
sic discussion of the lender of last resort) and because the debtor countries
do not have the “good collateral” (against which Bagehot said such lending
should be done). Indeed, after a half-decade of unprecedentedly large IMF-
led packages, the future is likely to involve much less availability of oﬃcial
funds.
The emerging market countries must therefore be prepared to protect
themselves against the unwarranted currency attacks and bank runs asso-
ciated with “pure contagion” and with deliberate attempts at destabilizing
speculation. For those countries that have full capital account convertibil-
ity, that means accumulating large enough reserves on their own to deter
speculators and reassure domestic and foreign investors.
Managing Financial and Currency Crises in Emerging markets
Although the crisis countries must manage their own recoveries, they
have done so in recent years under the close supervision and direction of the
IMF. The Fund has itself been guided to a large extent by the preferences of
the U.S. government and, to a lesser extent, by the preferences of the other
major Group of Seven (G7) countries. The IMF’s approach has diﬀered in
many ways from its behavior in earlier crises, particularly in the extent to
which it has used very large low-interest loans to induce and enforce wide-
ranging conditions of structural economic reform. It is important to assess
whether the new IMF policies were successful in dealing with the crises of
the 1990s and how those policies might be modiﬁed in the future.
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1. Have the crises been resolved, permitting the crisis countries to return
to solid economic growth and to achieve renewed access to international
capital markets?
2. Did the combination of monetary and ﬁscal policies and IMF loans
resolve the crisis with as little economic pain and damage as possible?
3. Did the structural reforms required by the IMF agreements actually
occur, and, to the extent that they did, were they successful?
4. How did the experience of the crisis countries aﬀect the incentives of
others: the lenders to be more careful in the future, the borrowers to reduce
future risks, and countries facing potential future crises to come earlier to
the IMF for assistance?
5. Were the actions of the IMF politically legitimate for an international
agency dealing with sovereign nations?
6. What were the political consequences of the crises and the policies
that followed?
Needless to say, these questions cannot be answered unambiguously, and
careful students of the data can reach diﬀerent conclusions. I oﬀer my own
evaluation knowing that readers will consult the views of others in this vol-
ume and elsewhere.
It is useful to begin by putting the current crisis management in the con-
text of the IMF’s history. When the IMF was established after World War
II, the major industrial countries were its main concern. Those countries
operated ﬁxed but adjustable exchange rate systems, often with some form
of capital control, within the framework of the gold-dollar standard. Bal-
ance-of-payments crises arose when excess domestic demand or inﬂation-
induced currency misalignments caused trade deﬁcits that led to unsus-
tainable pressure on the exchange rate. The IMF responded with a
combination of short-term balance-of-payments assistance (to allow the
crisis country to pay for imports) while advising the crisis country to de-
value its currency (to make its exports more competitive and to reduce its
imports) and to deﬂate domestic demand by contractionary monetary and
ﬁscal policy (to reduce imports, create capacity for exports, and end the in-
ﬂation that was frequently a cause of the currency misalignment). This de-
value-and-deﬂate became a standard part of the IMF prescription for deal-
ing with currency crises even when, as we shall see, such explicit deﬂation
strategy was not necessary. In time, the industrial countries generally aban-
doned the system of ﬁxed-but-adjustable exchange rates in favor of ﬂoating,
and the balance-of-payments crises ceased to be a signiﬁcant problem.
The 1980s saw Mexico and then nearly all of the Latin American coun-
tries face serious crises because of an inability to service their foreign debt.
That debt generally took the form of borrowing by the governments from
the commercial banks of the United States and other major industrial
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to service their debts was undermined in the early 1980s by a combination
of factors including the sharp appreciation of the dollar, the dramatic rise
of real dollar interest rates, and a global recession that reduced the demand
for and prices of the products of the Latin American economies. The IMF
responded with short-term loans that allowed the debtor countries to meet
at least part of their immediate debt service obligations and then focused its
eﬀorts on three things: advising the defaulting countries on the ﬁscal and
monetary policies needed to achieve a sustainable current account balance,
bringing borrowers and creditors together to negotiate debt restructuring,
and monitoring the ﬁscal and monetary performance on behalf of the cred-
itors.
The next challenge facing the IMF was providing assistance to the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as they sought to move
from being communist satellites of Russia to independent market econ-
omies. The IMF provided substantial technical assistance on a wide range
of subjects including privatization, tax systems, commercial legal struc-
tures, central banking, commercial banking, and securities markets.
The crises of the 1990s that began in Thailand and spread among the
Southeast Asian countries and to Latin America diﬀered from the earlier
crises in two basic ways: the debts were no longer concentrated in the com-
mercial banks of the industrial countries but had been shifted to bonds and
securatized loans; and the debtors were no longer the sovereign govern-
ments but were the private commercial banks and nonﬁnancial corpora-
tions in those countries. The crises arose, as I noted in the earlier part of this
chapter, from three primary sources: current account deﬁcits caused by
“ﬁxed but adjustable” exchange rates that had become overvalued; excess
amounts of foreign debt that could not be serviced in the short run if cred-
itors were not willing to roll over loans and bonds because the debt due in
the short run exceeded the countries’ foreign exchange reserves; and weak
banking systems that led to bank runs by domestic and foreign creditors.
Although the IMF’s response to these crises varied from country to coun-
try, the basic approach was the same in each case. The fund prescribed ﬂoat-
ing the currency, since the old ﬁxed rate could not be defended, but man-
dated high interest rates and tight ﬁscal policy to limit the extent of the
currency’s decline and to reduce the budget deﬁcit. It developed structural
reform plans covering a wide range of areas, including reform of commer-
cial and central banking, ending government support for private compa-
nies, opening product and capital markets, changing labor laws and corpo-
rate governance rules, eliminating subsidies for various products, and so on.
These extensive and detailed structural reforms were without precedent in
the IMF’s dealing with the industrial countries in the 1950s and 1960s or
with the Latin American crisis countries in the 1980s. Rather, they were sim-
ilar in style to the technical assistance given to countries of Eastern Euro-
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policies and structural reforms were embodied in letters of intent that, in
principle, bound the crisis country to comply. In exchange for their agree-
ment, the crisis countries received highly subsidized loans that were larger
than anything that had ever been contemplated before in an IMF program.
Korea’s, for example, was $57 billion. The loans were to be paid out gradu-
ally as the country showed that it was living up to its promises and achiev-
ing the structural reform goals set by the IMF.
The IMF described the big loan packages as a way to rebuild reserves and
to renew market conﬁdence in the crisis country. In practice, they were used
to pay creditors and were only made available with such lags and subject to
such strong but ambiguous conditions that the future portions of the loans
could not provide much comfort to foreign or domestic creditors. Their pur-
pose appeared to be to convince the crisis countries to accept the IMF’s
terms and to give the political leaders of each country the political cover
with its own population.
With that brief description as background, I turn to the six questions
listed above as the framework for evaluating the management of the crises
and the lessons for the future.
Have the Crises Been Resolved, Permitting the Crisis Countries to 
Return to Solid Economic Growth and to Achieve Renewed Access 
to International Capital Markets?
In general, the initial crises have been resolved, exchange rates have re-
bounded from their worst postcrisis levels and stabilized,6 and positive
growth has resumed. However, there are many ways in which the crises con-
tinue to aﬀect the countries. The growth rates have been much lower than
they had been for the three decades before the crises, foreign lending has not
resumed, stock markets are much lower than they were before the onset of
the crisis, domestic lending to the private sector has essentially collapsed, and
the domestic ﬁnancial sector has not been restructured and strengthened.
The balance of payments improved substantially, driven initially by the
collapse of import demand when the crisis countries went into deep reces-
sions and continued with improved exports as a result of the sharp fall in the
real exchange rate. The countries used the resulting current account sur-
pluses to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, with Korea achieving $50
billion by the end of 2000.
Gross domestic product declined sharply after the crisis began because of
the collapse of credit and because the increased value of debt (measured in
domestic currencies) impoverished many households and caused wide-
spread business bankruptcies. The sharp decline of the currency, however,
brought a sharp upturn in late 1998 and 1999 as exports boomed, but the
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they had been from 1970 to the start of the crisis.
It is of course diﬃcult to know whether the recession and subsequent re-
covery would have been diﬀerent without the IMF programs or with diﬀer-
ent policies. It is clear that the growth resumed because of the currency col-
lapse and the resulting rise of exports and not because of anything more
fundamental. Also, by late 1999 the IMF had relaxed its tight monetary and
ﬁscal policies.
It is signiﬁcant that neither domestic lending nor foreign capital has come
back to its previous level. Similarly, the low level of real growth represents
a failure to reestablish the previous performance of the “Asian tigers.” This
may be the result of the crisis itself or of the policies that weakened the
economies, leaving a trail of corporate bankruptcies and insolvent banks
that cannot provide the credit needed to achieve strong growth. The general
public and the business community—even in Korea, which might be con-
sidered the most successful of the crisis countries—may exhibit depressed
levels of demand because of a shattering of conﬁdence in the future and a
concern that the economy could return to the same crisis conditions that
they have recently escaped.
The IMF spoke of trying to restore conﬁdence by a combination of large
loans, tough monetary and ﬁscal policies, and widespread structural re-
forms. The combination of IMF statements, the extensiveness of the re-
forms, and the delayed loan payouts may have had the opposite eﬀect.
When the crisis hit, the IMF did not try to argue that the problem was one
of illiquidity (a temporary inability to pay) rather than insolvency (a per-
manent inability to repay), even for a country like Korea, where the total
foreign debt was only about one-third of GDP. Instead, the senior IMF oﬃ-
cials insisted that all of the crisis countries were fundamentally sick—char-
acterized by political corruption, “crony capitalism,” inadequate ﬁnancial
systems, and the like. Foreign lenders and investors who had been happy to
lend and invest until mid-1997 were shocked by the crisis and discouraged
by the IMF’s diagnosis. The extensive structural reforms called for by the
IMF and the notion that the countries needed large loans that would only
be paid out gradually and conditionally on meeting vague performance tar-
gets of structural reform was a further blow to conﬁdence. All of this con-
tinues to weigh on the crisis countries’ access to funds.
The situation in Indonesia is fundamentally worse than in the other cri-
sis countries. In addition to the problems that aﬀect the other countries, In-
donesia is caught in a political crisis. The economic collapse and the IMF
policies forced President Suharto’s resignation. The small but economically
important Chinese minority that Suharto had protected became the object
of political and physical attacks and withdrew in part from the economic
activities that they had previously performed. The political and military
turmoil has depressed foreign lending and direct investment.
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Resolve the Crisis With as Little Economic Pain and Damage as Possible?
I agree with the critics of the IMF policies who claim that they caused un-
necessary pain and damage in the early stage of the crisis because of exces-
sively tight monetary and ﬁscal policies. I suspect that the short-run dam-
age had a continuing adverse eﬀect that depressed growth in 2000 and 2001
and beyond.
The IMF called for increases in taxes to reduce the budget deﬁcits that
would result from the reduced tax collection in the economic downturn and
from the increase in public-sector debt that would result from the govern-
ment’s assumption of some of the liabilities of banks and corporations. It is
hard to understand why the IMF pursued such contractionary policies at a
time when economic activity in the crisis economies was collapsing, with
real GDP growth dropping from more than 5 percent per year to equally
large negative amounts.
I suspect that this reﬂects a continuation of old IMF policies designed for
diﬀerent problems. The balance-of-payments crises in the industrial coun-
tries in the 1950s and 1960s were often associated with low levels of national
saving caused by excessive government borrowing that needed to be re-
versed. The Latin American crises in the 1980s were also characterized by
large government budget deﬁcits. In contrast, the Asian tigers had very high
national saving rates, often exceeding 30 percent of GDP, and did not have
large budget deﬁcits.
The tight ﬁscal and monetary policies may also have been a holdover
from the tradition of “devalue and deﬂate” as a way of dealing with bal-
ance-of-payments crises. Any such explicit policy action to deﬂate demand
was unnecessary in the Asian crisis countries because of the debt deﬂa-
tion—that is, because the market-driven currency devaluation caused a ma-
jor deﬂationary eﬀect by increasing the value of debts in the local currency.
The devalue-and-deﬂate recipe, ﬁrst advocated for the industrial countries
by James Meade in the 1950s, was not intended for an economy with sub-
stantial international debt denominated in the foreign currency. The debt
deﬂation in the Asian crisis countries meant widespread bankruptcies and
a collapse of lending by local banks to the few creditworthy borrowers that
remained.
The economic downturn was particularly hard on the urban poor. In ad-
dition to widespread job losses, their real incomes were reduced by the rise
in prices of imported products and of local products (especially food) that
could now be sold on world markets for higher prices in the local currency.
The rural poor were less hard hit because they were much less dependent on
the market economy for food and housing and could gain by selling their
agricultural products at higher domestic prices because of the currency de-
valuation.
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too tight at the start of its programs but notes in self-defense that it subse-
quently and repeatedly allowed an easing of ﬁscal policy (IMF staﬀ 2001).
The fact remains, however, that the ﬁscal policies required by the IMF made
the cyclical situation worse. Moreover, whatever the desirability of limiting
budget deﬁcits, there was no attempt to balance the contractionary eﬀects
of higher tax rates with structural tax incentives to encourage more invest-
ment and economic recovery.
The IMF also required the crisis countries to raise interest rates sharply
to defend their currencies. Real interest rates jumped to more than 20 per-
cent in Korea and other countries. The Fund argued that this was impor-
tant for three reasons. First, it believed that each falling currency put
downward pressure on the other currencies in the region, leading to a con-
tinuing downward spiral of exchange rates. Second, it argued that currency
stability was needed to achieve confidence in the country both at home
and abroad. Third, currency stability was needed to prevent further debt
deﬂation.
Balanced against this, of course, was the usual direct adverse eﬀect of
high interest rates on domestic demand. High debt to capital levels made
the rise in interest rates particularly damaging, leading to a great increase in
the volume of nonperforming loans and to widespread bankruptcies. This
was particularly important because the crisis countries were experiencing
not only a currency crisis but also a ﬁnancial crisis characterized by non-
performing loans and widespread bank failures. Treating that ﬁnancial cri-
sis by itself would require increasing liquidity and lowering interest rates.
The Fund’s argument that currency declines had to be checked by high
interest rates to avoid a continuing downward spiral ignored the fact that
at some point the currencies would be so undervalued that foreign specu-
lators would want to buy them. A currency can attract investors even with
a low interest rate if potential investors believe that it has fallen below its
equilibrium level and can therefore be expected to appreciate. At some
point, the falling currencies of the crisis countries would attract that kind of
speculative buying. Even if all of the currencies in the region fell together,
they would still be declining relative to the dollar, the European currencies,
and probably the Japanese yen. The improved competitiveness that would
result would provide a natural lower limit to their decline.
In using high interest rates to stop the currency decline, the IMF was im-
plicitly setting a target exchange rate for the currency. There is no reason to
believe that the IMF actually had any idea of what an equilibrium exchange
rate should be after the sharp declines in the exchange rates of some of the
competing currencies and the collapse of much of the domestic supply-side
capacity. The Korean won, for example, fell from 800 won per dollar at the
start of the crisis to 1,800 won per dollar before bouncing back to 1,100 won
per dollar.
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high interest rates to stabilize the currency, it did nothing to oﬀset the ad-
verse eﬀects of those high interest rates on the domestic economy. It would
have been possible to use targeted ﬁscal policies to oﬀset the adverse eﬀects
of the high interest rates on the domestic borrowers while maintaining the
favorable international eﬀect of high interest rates on the demand for the
currency. For example, a corporate tax credit based on the amount of the
company’s debt in the year before the crisis would oﬀset the destructive
eﬀect of the higher interest rate on the ability to service existing debt while
not changing the marginal incentive eﬀect to foreign and domestic in-
vestors.
The Fund, together with the World Bank and some of the G7 countries,
provided large subsidized loans to the crisis countries. These loans permit-
ted the countries to meet their immediate foreign currency obligations to
foreign creditors and to provide foreign exchange to private borrowers so
that they could meet their obligations. These loans, at very subsidized rates,
were a strong incentive to accept the Fund’s painful monetary and ﬁscal
policies and the very intrusive structural policies that I discuss below. How-
ever, unlike the loans of a domestic lender of last resort, they did not serve
to prevent runs by domestic and foreign creditors or otherwise to oﬀset the
contractionary eﬀects of the tight monetary and ﬁscal policies.
A domestic central bank, acting as a lender of last resort, can stop runs
by oﬀering to lend without limit but against good collateral at a penal rate.
The fact that it is known to be ready to provide such liquidity is enough to
stop runs against sound but illiquid banks. The IMF does not have the re-
sources to lend as much as the foreign debt of the crisis countries. The coun-
tries themselves do not have good collateral that would make lending safe
for the Fund, and theFund lends at a very much subsidized rate to make its
loans attractive so that it can trade these subsidized loans for an acceptance
of its conditionality.
The loans failed to reassure foreign lenders not only because they were
limited in magnitude relative to the size of the country’s external debt but
also because the funds were not available immediately but could only be
drawn over time as the country carried out its agreement with the IMF. Al-
though the agreement was stated in a detailed letter of intent signed by the
country, these agreements were frequently revised; Korea signed nine such
letters of intent between December 1997 and July 2000. Many of the poli-
cies on which payouts were conditioned were unlikely to be done, and oth-
ers were so ambiguous that they left the Fund with substantial discretion
about whether the debtor country had done enough to warrant payment by
the Fund.
Some critics of the IMF’s policies point to Malaysia as an example of a
country that was hit by the crisis but that chose not to go to the Fund for
help. It declared a standstill on payments of foreign obligations and closed
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decline in Malaysia was less than in other countries, this may be more a mat-
ter of timing than of better performance.
Looking ahead, the International Financial Institution Advisory Com-
mission (known also as the Meltzer commission) has suggested that the
IMF loans be replaced by Conditional Credit Lines (CCLs), for which
countries could prequalify. The IMF has accepted this idea as an additional
option rather than as a replacement for its existing programs. The basic idea
of the CCL is that a country that has sound macroeconomic and structural
policies could apply for prequaliﬁcation approval. If it is approved, it would
have the right to draw funds in case its currency came under attack. The
logic is that such an attack would be an unwarranted speculative attack that
the country should be able to repulse. It is signiﬁcant that no country has
yet to apply for such CCL prequaliﬁcation approval. Doing so might be re-
garded as a negative signal by market participants, an indication that the
country expects its currency to be attacked. There is the further problem
that the country would presumably have to be re-approved from time to
time. If the country failed to be reapproved, that would be a very serious sig-
nal to the market, indicating that the credit line is no longer available and
that the fund had concluded that the country’s policies were such that it no
longer met the standard. It seems very unlikely that the CCL will ever be a
viable alternative to direct debt workouts.
There is also much discussion about ways to enforce “private-sector in-
volvement,” that is, the imposition of some mandatory losses on private
lenders. I ﬁnd it strange that this is thought of as a matter for Fund policy
rather than as a natural outcome of a debt workout in a future in which the
IMF’s funds are more limited than they have been in the past. If the debtor
country cannot aﬀord to make the payments that are due and the Fund
does not have suﬃcient funds to permit it to lend that amount to the debtor
country, the outcome must be a debt restructuring. Bank creditors will ﬁnd
that they have to roll over loans, delaying principal repayments and accept-
ing lower interest rates. The private bond holders may also find that their
bonds are exchanged for new ones with lower interest rates or rescheduled
principal payments or both.
One of the serious problems in the debt workouts since 1997 has been the
inadequate development of bankruptcy laws and procedures in many of the
emerging market countries. When private creditors have made loans to
private borrowers in an emerging market country, the usual remedy of the
courts should be available. Creditors should be able to take property, in-
cluding real estate and ongoing businesses, if the debtors cannot make the
promised payments.
Special bond provisions that allow actions to be taken by a majority of
bond holders, rather than the unanimity rules that now prevail on most
bonds, would facilitate such debt restructuring. However, in doing so, they
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capital to high-quality borrowers in the emerging market countries. It is not
surprising that oﬃcials in Mexico and Brazil, for example, have opposed
the introduction of such bonds.
Did the Structural Reforms Required by the IMF Agreements Actually
Occur, and, to the Extent That They Did, Were They Successful?
In responding to the crises that began in Thailand in 1997, the IMF re-
quired structural reforms by the debtor countries that were unprecedented
in both range and detail as a condition for its approval and for the substan-
tial funds that would accompany that approval.7 The speciﬁc conditions
diﬀered from country to country, but all of the programs had substan-
tially similar elements. The Fund stipulated that it would release successive
tranches of its multibillion loans only as these changes were implemented.
Some of the structural reforms were aimed at improving the banking sec-
tor and the process of capital accumulation. Among other things, the IMF
called upon the debtor country to make its central bank independent of
the political authorities and committed to price stability. The Fund also or-
dered governments to stop interfering in the loans made by the commercial
banks to industrial companies. The debtor countries were also told to re-
capitalize the commercial banks so that they met international capital stan-
dards, to consolidate weak banks with stronger ones, and to permit foreign
investors to buy troubled banks. Complete deposit insurance was to be elim-
inated so that depositors would have a greater incentive to monitor the risk-
taking by the banks.
A second focus of structural reforms involved corporate ﬁnance and gov-
ernance. The Fund called for substantial reductions in corporate leverage,
major changes in accounting practices, and restructuring of corporate
board memberships. Restrictions on foreign share ownership were to be
eliminated, and government-owned corporations were to be privatized. The
legal structure was to be modiﬁed in various ways and bankruptcy proce-
dures altered to increase the eﬀective rights of creditors.
Much was made of “crony capitalism,” that is, the granting of preferen-
tial treatment to favored companies, political allies, and members of the
governing family. The fund pointed out that such behavior was not accept-
able in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom. Speciﬁc
practices such as the granting of monopolies to particular companies or in-
dividuals were also to end.
The Fund required the end of many government subsidies, even of prod-
ucts—like cooking oil—that were widely purchased by low-income house-
holds. Other changes involved labor laws, the provision of unemployment
22 Martin Feldstein
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ysis of the myriad of changes called for in the diﬀerent programs.beneﬁts and other social insurance, and tax reform. Barriers to trade and
foreign direct investment were to be eliminated.
It is clear that these “mandatory” changes went far beyond what was nec-
essary to stabilize the individual economies or to allow them to regain vol-
untary access to the global capital markets. The Fund had gotten into the
habit in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union of telling countries
what it regards as “best practice” in a wide variety of aspects of national
economic management. It now used the leverage that it had with the crisis
countries to try to force such changes on them. The Fund’s managing di-
rector, Michel Camdessus, once commented that the crises were a blessing
in disguise because they provided the fund with the opportunity to improve
the economic structure and governance of these countries.
The Fund sometimes justiﬁed the far-reaching structural programs as
necessary to regain conﬁdence in the country among foreign investors. In
fact, of course, those investors had shown substantial conﬁdence before the
crisis, lending and investing large amounts of money. If they now inter-
preted the crises in the debtor countries as due to more than an overvalued
exchange rate, a mismanaged international balance sheet, and an underde-
veloped banking system, it was probably because of the IMF’s very public
criticism of what it regarded as fundamental structural problems.
The demand for detailed changes in so many aspects of the countries’
economies created local opposition to the Fund programs, both because
they would hurt powerful special interests and because they were widely felt
within the countries to be an overreaching by the fund into subjects that
should be left to national decision-making. Any attempt to deal with the
full range of structural changes while also trying to manage a short-term re-
covery from the crisis put severe strains on government competence that
made economic recovery and foreign debt negotiations more diﬃcult.
The IMF, in an oﬃcial review of its experience in the crisis countries, has
now acknowledged that their structural programs were excessive (IMF staﬀ
2001) and has said that in the future it would try to distinguish between
those structural changes that are necessary for the success of the country’s
recovery from the crisis and those other structural changes that the Fund
deems to be useful and desirable but not necessary for the country’s recov-
ery. It remains to be seen how well this distinction will work in practice.
Moreover, even if the Fund does not insist on certain structural reforms in
future crises, if it or the World Bank oﬀers substantial ﬁnancial incentives
to make the change, it is politically very diﬃcult for countries to resist ac-
cepting the oﬀer.
At ﬁrst, the political leaders in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand said that
they would refuse to accept the IMF’s conditions. They soon relented, how-
ever, saying that they would implement the plans, and signing the agree-
ments with the IMF in exchange for the promise that very large amounts of
money would be paid as the program was implemented. In practice, how-
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seem most relevant to the success of their programs. They nevertheless gen-
erally received the funds that the IMF had said were conditional on adher-
ence to the terms of the program.
In Korea, for example, the Fund placed great emphasis on eliminating
the government’s role in capital allocation and making the commercial
banks fully independent, ending the tradition in which bank lending was
subject to detailed Ministry of Finance guidance. What has actually hap-
pened is that the government has infused substantial public money as eq-
uity in the banks in order to recapitalize them after their widespread losses
and thus obtained a new basis for government control over the banks’ activ-
ities. Although the banks’ managements are in principle free to act without
consulting their government owners, the actual practice keeps the govern-
ment very much involved in major lending decisions, particularly to com-
panies that are in trouble. Moreover, since the banks have become owners
of many foreclosed nonﬁnancial corporations, the Korean government is in
fact the indirect owner of these companies as well. Although the govern-
ment of Korea is in principle willing to sell to foreign investors these banks
and the nonﬁnancial corporations that the banks have acquired, there is in
fact little desire to sell them at the prices that potential buyers would be will-
ing to pay. There have been many negotiations but relatively few sales. Al-
though the banking sector is improving, it will be a long time before Korea
has an adequate number of experienced bankers who are capable of mak-
ing loan decisions on strictly commercial considerations and evaluating
credit risks more generally even if the government is willing to let them do so.
Korea has now graduated from its IMF program and repaid its IMF
loans. It has accumulated foreign exchange reserves of more than $100 bil-
lion and has an exchange rate that gives it a healthy balance-of-trade sur-
plus. Korea clearly does not want to ﬁnd itself again under IMF manage-
ment.
How Did the Experience of the Crisis Countries Aﬀect the Incentives of
Others: the Lenders to Be More Careful in the Future, the Borrowers to
Reduce Future Risks, and Countries Facing Potential Future Crises to
Come Earlier to the IMF for Assistance?
The crises were clearly painful experiences for the debtor countries, and
they are taking some steps to avoid a repetition of that pain. Korea’s $100
billion of foreign exchange is far more than the IMF has told Korea is ade-
quate and prudent. Korea is nevertheless willing to incur the cost of hold-
ing those reserves because it does not want to ﬁnd itself again under IMF
supervision. That surplus and a ﬂoating exchange rate that produces large
trade surpluses are likely to succeed in keeping Korea away from IMF su-
pervision for as long as those conditions last.
Many of the critics of the IMF’s crisis management argue that the Fund’s
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itors creates a “moral hazard” problem in which emerging market countries
and their creditors take excessive risk because they know that creditors will
be paid relatively quickly in a crisis and without having to take substantial
losses of principal. This causes a greater willingness to lend and keeps the
interest rates on those loans substantially lower than they would otherwise
be. The borrowers and the borrowing countries are then tempted by these
relatively low-interest commercial loans to borrow more than they should,
particularly in dollars, which causes a serious deﬂationary problem if the lo-
cal currency devalues sharply.
There is no doubt that the large low-interest loans provided by the IMF
made it easier for the debtor countries to repay their creditors and therefore
reduced the cost of the crisis to both debtors and creditors relative to what
it would otherwise have been. Whether this eﬀect was large enough to make
borrowers and lenders less vigilant than they would otherwise have been is
uncertain. Moreover, even if one can presume that some decrease in pru-
dence would inevitably follow the provision of such subsidized lending, it is
not clear whether the magnitude of the change in behavior is signiﬁcant
enough to be a problem.
Despite the loans from the IMF, the individuals who were directly in-
volved suﬀered signiﬁcant personal losses. The ﬁnance ministers in the
debtor countries lost their jobs, the business owners in the debtor countries
were frequently in bankruptcy, and the bankers involved on both sides of
the transactions were often ﬁred. The banks that loaned the money were fre-
quently forced to roll over their loans, taking greater risk without adequate
additional compensation. Bondholders were also forced to take some
losses. For some while at least, the ﬂow of both debt and equity funds to the
emerging market countries as a group declined.
The large losses incurred on loans to Russia may have further reduced the
moral hazard problem. Before the Russian default, it was widely assumed
that because of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and geopolitical importance, it
would not be allowed to default. However, the moral hazard risk was in-
creased when the IMF provided Turkey with substantial ﬁnancial support
and gave a major loan to Argentina in 2001 when it was becoming clear
that, because of the devaluation of the Brazilian real, Argentina would not
be able to maintain its peg to the dollar. Nevertheless, the willingness of
private lenders to maintain their loans to Argentina in 2001 shows a con-
tinued appetite for risk that some would regard as unwarranted and based
on the assumption that the Fund would be there to help in a future crisis.
A quite diﬀerent incentive eﬀect of the IMF programs is on countries that
see a potential crisis looming but do not want to put themselves in the hands
of the IMF. Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea all waited as long as they could
before coming to the IMF. Their experience after coming to the IMF in
1997 is not likely to do anything to cause future governments in those coun-
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reasons why the political leaders of a country put oﬀgoing to the IMF. Do-
ing so indicates a failure of policy that is likely to be harmful in the next elec-
tion. If the IMF requires ﬂoating the currency or devaluing the exchange
rate, many local businesses will be adversely aﬀected, no doubt including
many who are close to the governing party. The experience in the recent
crises is likely to convince political leaders in countries that face crises in the
future that bringing in the IMF may lead to their own ouster and, even if
they can stay in oﬃce, in a shift of power to the IMF staﬀ. Waiting has the
virtue that the crisis may be postponed and may even go away if the real ex-
change rate declines as a result of changes in the currencies of other trading
partners and trade competitors.
If the IMF wants to be actively involved in preventing crises in individual
countries as well as in dealing with those countries after crises occur, it can-
not continue to be seen as a source of national pain and political embar-
rassment to the government in power. It must become a helpful resource to
the countries that are approaching a crisis point. If it wants to reduce the
risk of ﬁnancial crises, the IMF must change its behavior during crises so
that it is called upon at an earlier stage, before a full-scale crisis is inevitable.
Were the Actions of the IMF Politically Legitimate for an 
International Agency Dealing with Sovereign Nations?
This politically powerful question cannot be given a technical answer.
There is no doubt, however, that it is an extremely important question to the
debtor countries that are required to accept IMF programs and to all of the
countries that contemplate the chance of such an IMF intrusion into their
domestic aﬀairs. The United States does not and cannot think about the
possibility of being a subject of such a program, but virtually every other
country in the world can identify with the countries that have had IMF pro-
grams. The legitimacy of those programs themselves is therefore at stake.
It is clear from the experience of the past few years that the IMF is much
more than an adviser and a source of credit to which countries are entitled
by virtue of their membership in the Fund. When a country begins a pro-
gram with the Fund, it signs a letter of intent that imposes certain obliga-
tions on the country. The extraordinarily large loans that the IMF can bring
to a country put its politicians in a position in which it would be very diﬃ-
cult, if not impossible, to reject the IMF’s advice if it meant also forgoing
the billions of dollars of economic help.
The power of the IMF to force its policies on countries raises the impor-
tant question of the legitimate role of an international ﬁnancial institution
in dealing with sovereign countries. Even if the technical soundness of the
IMF’s prescriptions was beyond doubt, is it appropriate for the Fund to
impose rules about such things as the role and independence of the central
bank or the rights of workers or the nature of social insurance beneﬁts of
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appropriate unless they are necessary to resolve the current crisis and to
permit the debtor country to regain access to the international capital mar-
ket. Extending the scope of mandatory policies to other things that the
fund’s staﬀ believes is in the long-run interest of the debtor country is not a
legitimate part of the IMF’s mandate. It is likely to do more harm than good
by creating resistance to the program as a whole and by discouraging coun-
tries from seeking Fund help at an early stage.
In some cases, the Fund’s staﬀbased mandated structural reforms on the
suggestions of the political party that was then out of power in the debtor
country (and therefore critical of the policies of the existing government).
In Korea, for example, signiﬁcant parts of the structural reforms were de-
signed by the staﬀof the opposition presidential candidate at the time of the
crisis. When he won the election, those policies became the policies of the
president. These policies could not, however, have been turned into laws
without IMF leverage because the democratically elected parliament had
not changed political parties. Although the Fund’s staﬀ pointed to the sup-
port for those parts of the program by the new Korean president, it remains
true that the program had to be imposed because it could not obtain the po-
litical support needed to be enacted according to the country’s constitu-
tional rules.
The appropriateness of the Fund’s imposition of detailed structural poli-
cies is made even more questionable by uncertainty about the technical cor-
rectness of the Fund’s advice. Fashions in economic policy change over the
years. A generation ago, the conventional wisdom favored ﬁxed exchange
rates, and many economists believed that a country should aim to grow by
substituting domestic production for foreign imports. Today the Fund pro-
motes ﬂexible exchange rates, and most economists support the pursuit of
comparative advantage in trade. A generation from now, will the policies
that the IMF now imposes on countries still be deemed to have been cor-
rect?
What Were the Political Consequences of the Crises 
and the Policies That Followed?
The appropriateness of the IMF’s programs cannot be evaluated without
considering the political consequences of the Fund’s programs on the crisis
countries and on the relation of those countries and other emerging market
nations to the industrial countries in general and to the United States in
particular.
The IMF was originally conceived of as a kind of mutual assistance or-
ganization to which countries made ﬁnancial contributions and from which
they could borrow funds in times of temporary ﬁnancial crisis. With the shift
of its activities from the industrial countries to the emerging market econ-
omies, the Fund might be seen as a way in which the industrial countries
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trouble. There is a danger, however, that the Fund is instead viewed as the
agent of the industrial countries that lends in times of crisis so that the cred-
itor banks and bond holders in the industrial countries can be repaid, us-
ing the leverage of the Fund’s credit line and approval process to force the
debtor countries to make changes that benefit the business community in
the G7 countries. The U.S. Congress and other national parliaments in the
G7 countries are prepared to vote large sums for the IMF and for bilateral
assistance only on the condition that the IMF impose policies that beneﬁt
their business and labor constituents.
The statements of oﬃcials in the debtor countries are not a useful basis
for assessing their true attitudes because they remain dependent on the good
will of the Fund and the creditor countries. The actions and statements of
the nongovernment organizations that decry globalization and the inter-
national ﬁnancial organizations may be equally misleading in the opposite
direction as a true indication of the opinions of the public and the elites in
the emerging market countries.
The long-term political eﬀects of the Fund programs within the debtor
countries are no less diﬃcult to evaluate. The humiliation of the govern-
ment and its leaders, the shift of power from the national government to the
IMF, and the radical reforms imposed by the Fund can all have powerful
eﬀects on domestic politics in both the short run and the longer term. In-
donesia is a good example of this process. Indonesia is a large and strategi-
cally located country with the second largest Moslem population in the
world. The actions of the IMF in Indonesia led to the resignation of Presi-
dent Suharto and the introduction of a series of short-term and weak na-
tional leaders. The speciﬁc policies were particularly hard on urban work-
ers and the urban poor, politically volatile groups in any emerging market
country. Even now, several years later, the political future and stability of In-
donesia are unclear and civil war exists in important regions of the country.
The eventual dissolution of Indonesia as a single nation cannot be ruled
out, and the geopolitical consequences of such a dissolution cannot be fore-
seen.
Even before Suharto’s resignation, the IMF’s policies demonstrated that
he had lost control of the government. When that occurred, many of the im-
portant Chinese minority in Indonesia left out of fear for their personal
safety and for the dangers to their businesses. Suharto had protected the
Chinese minority because he valued their central role in providing entre-
preneurship, capital and global market connections for Indonesia. Su-
harto’s resignation made it much more diﬃcult to achieve economic stabil-
ity and contributed to the political uncertainty and instability that have
characterized Indonesia since then.
The IMF programs also coincided with changes in political leadership in
Korea and Thailand. It may be because the conditions that forced the au-
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group to govern. However, that did not happen in Malaysia, where the ﬁ-
nancial crisis also caused economic decline but where Prime Minister Ma-
hathir did not accept an IMF program. There are too many political factors
that are speciﬁc to each country to draw any ﬁrm conclusions. However,
there were no doubt oﬃcials at the IMF who believed that the fundamental
economic restructuring that the Fund wanted could only be carried out if
there was a change in the local government leadership. Quite apart from the
inappropriateness of an IMF strategy that includes encouraging a change
of government, there is the obvious adverse incentive eﬀect that such be-
havior has on the willingness of any government to seek IMF help at an
early stage.
The painful IMF programs antagonized the people of the recipient coun-
tries who objected to the policies imposed by the Fund and to the way in
which those policies were imposed. The harsh public criticisms by the Fund
were a blow to the pride of the people who had seen their countries as the
Asian miracle just a few years earlier.
This antagonism was directed not only at the Fund but at the western na-
tions generally and at the United States in particular because it was seen
as the power that dictated the Fund’s programs. Critics were aware that
some of the Fund’s “reform conditions” were required by the United States,
Japan, and European countries seeking market opening for their products
and services. They particularly resented the pressure to sell domestic ﬁrms
to foreign buyers at what they believed would be “ﬁre sale” prices during the
crisis and early recovery years.
It is not easy for the residents of the debtor countries or even for their so-
phisticated elites to distinguish the painful eﬀects of the crises that they
brought upon themselves from the pain of the macroeconomic adjustments
and radical structural reforms that the IMF imposed. However, the experi-
ence as a whole no doubt contributed to a general distrust of “globaliza-
tion” and of western institutions in all of the emerging market countries.
For many groups in these countries, the experience also increased the dis-
taste for the market system and for capitalism. The long-term consequences
of these changes may be the most serious and lasting eﬀects of the crises.
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